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LIBERATED FRENCH MOVE TOWARD FOURTH REPUBLIC

ALTHOUGH the Allies' major objective in the Battle of France was achieved with the destruction of the Nazis' Seventh Army, as announced by General Eisenhower on August 26, it is the resulting liberation of almost half of France—including Paris itself—that stirs the Allied world more than any of its previous military victories. Paris occupies a unique place in the sentiments of the freedom-loving world, and its rebirth of independence seems the perfect symbol of the eventual triumph of the United Nations. But the freeing of a large part of France has done more than give a tremendous boost to Allied morale. It has also dispelled grave fears concerning the future of France that prevailed among many Americans as long as the temper of the French people inside Hitler's fortress remained a matter of speculation rather than observation. Under those conditions doubts arose about the French people's devotion to liberty and the Allied cause, and led to cautious American policies that the Free French resented but were unable to attack with conclusive evidence. Now, however, that Frenchmen in France are free to speak for themselves, it is possible at last for realities instead of opinion and incomplete underground reports to shape our policy, and it can be confidently anticipated that Franco-American relations will be improved as a result.

TEMPER OF FRANCE REVEALED. Among the fears dispelled by our new contact with the Frenchmen who have lived under enemy occupation was the belief that France's strength and spirit might have been so seriously sapped by the nation's four years of suffering that its people would be indifferent to liberation and incapable of aiding the Allies at that crucial moment. During the period immediately following D-Day there seemed to be some basis for this disquieting thought, for from Normandy came reports that many of the peasants were either apathetic to the invasion or concerned above all with the de-

struction of their property resulting from this new phase of the war. But now that Paris and the important cities of the south of France have responded to the Allies' arrival with unbounded joy and eagerness to cooperate in speeding the day of German defeat, we know that the spirit of Normandy was not typical of France as a whole. Far from presenting the spectacle of an indifferent and broken people, the French of Paris, Marseilles, Toulon, and other important centers, appear—in our first glimpses of them—as a nation in which youthful leaders and the enthusiastic spirit of youth abound. On first thought it is surprising to find young men and women figuring so prominently in the liberated towns and cities since pre-war France was usually led by men of advanced years, and millions of young Frenchmen are still held by the Germans as prisoners of war or conscript laborers. Yet it is probably precisely because pre-war leaders were discredited in France and German rule was so severe that thousands of French youth felt compelled to join the Maquis.

French members of the underground have played an important role in liberating their country, both by supplying vital information on which pre-invasion Allied air attacks were planned and by destroying German communications and directing the Allies to concealed Nazi positions during the Battle of France. That the Maquis were rarely able to attack German positions successfully does not detract from their achievements for, regardless of courage and daring, men with rifles are no match for regular soldiers armed with machine guns and mortars. And the French tendency to exaggerate the Maquis' successes—as de Gaulle did on August 25, when he declared Paris had been "liberated by ourselves"—is natural on the part of a people vitally interested in re-establishing France as a great power.

FRIENDSHIP FOR U.S. There is, however, glory and gratitude enough for both the Maquis and the

Allies in France, and the Frenchmen's enormous enthusiasm for the American soldiers has disproved the pre-invasion prophecy that liberated Frenchmen might be cold and unfriendly toward the United States. The tensions between Algiers and Washington, it appears, are almost unknown in France and have done nothing to damage the traditional friendship for the United States among the French people as a whole. The United States and the leaders of the new France will have, therefore, a fresh chance, unclouded by the record of Algiers-Washington disputes, to establish close bonds between the two republics in the post-war period.

American fears that General de Gaulle might not represent any sizable proportion of Frenchmen and that the French majority might therefore resent any efforts by the United States to support his provisional government, have also been dispelled by recent events in France. Yet weeks before these proofs of de Gaulle's widespread popularity were received the United States was obliged to accept his unauthorized appointments of administrators in Normandy because of the sheer impracticability of the original American plan that required General Eisenhower to choose the French personnel needed for administering liberated French territory. This practical consideration, in fact, rather than any admission that de Gaulle represents France, forms the basis of the new agreement between Washington and General de Gaulle that was signed August 22. This arrangement merely recognizes and extends to other parts of France the administrative system that de Gaulle worked out in Normandy and specifically states that it will continue only as long as de Gaulle's group continues "to receive the support of the majority of the Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France." American policy toward de Gaulle still remains, therefore, a cautious one in which the burden of proof of his leadership rests entirely upon him.

DE GAULLE'S POLITICAL FUTURE. In view of the widespread French enthusiasm for de Gaulle as the symbol of national rebirth, there can no longer be any doubt about his enormous popularity and prestige in France. However, his claim to be the political leader of France and the head of a "government" that soon expects to move from Algiers to Paris remains to be tested. In this political realm de

Gaulle's success will rest, in large part, on his ability to cooperate with the local leaders of resistance, for members of the Maquis will undoubtedly demand important places in France's new government. This task of incorporating the Maquis into his régime should not prove too difficult for de Gaulle, for he has been in close contact with the underground since its formation and has always based his claim to represent France on his ties with the forces of resistance. Moreover, de Gaulle's administrators in Normandy have shown signs of recognizing the importance of local resistance leaders by cooperating with them.

Whether de Gaulle wins the French people's approval as their political leader depends to an even greater extent on his ability to become the acknowledged spokesman of the French patriots who have paid dearly for the liberation of their country and demand, in return, a new France that will succeed where the old one failed. Consideration of these demands has apparently shaped de Gaulle's outline for a new Fourth Republic to replace the régime he insists Marshal Pétain destroyed when he accepted defeat in 1940. The Fourth Republic, de Gaulle has indicated, will rest on a new economic structure in which the state will control great sources of national wealth and organized workers will share in the conduct of industry. Whether this program of modified state socialism will be in tune with the ideas of the liberated French people remains to be seen, but it can hardly be expected that a system of free enterprise will appeal to a nation whose capitalist economy collapsed under German pressure.

De Gaulle's reiterated pledge that France's new government shall rest on an election in which women as well as men shall have the vote also expresses the demands of French underground leaders for a complete break with the Third Republic. And it is in this same spirit of reform that de Gaulle promised the French people on August 25 that their deep desire for security from future German invasions will be fulfilled. France also has a right, he insisted, "to be in the first line among the great nations who are going to organize the peace and the life of the world. She has a right to be heard in all four corners of the world." In this declaration there are hints of the strong foreign policy the new France will demand.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

REACTIONARIES IN BRAZIL FORCE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESIGNATION

The resignation of Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha on August 23, widely interpreted as a blow to pro-Allied sentiment, actually hints at the existence of great cracks in the internal structure of Brazil. The second most important political figure in the country, Aranha has long been a supporter of President Getulio Vargas, whom he helped to power in the revolution of 1930. In his own right,

however, he has distinguished himself as the principal Brazilian spokesman for the Allies. As Ambassador to Washington and later as President of the Rio Conference in 1942, where he contributed no little to the drama of the final session by announcing cessation of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, he has worked constantly for closer identification of his country with the fortunes of the United Na-

tions. It was in large part due to his efforts that on August 20, 1944 a Brazilian Expeditionary Force joined the Fifth Army in Italy. His espousal of the cause of the democracies to which many Brazilians are inherently sympathetic has won him wide support, despite recent reports that his prestige is on the wane.

DICTATORSHIP STRENGTHENED. At a time when every political occurrence is being assessed in the light of its influence on the Presidential elections which Vargas has repeatedly promised for the end of the war, Aranha's resignation is significant. Should he present himself as a candidate, he would undoubtedly carry a considerable portion of the liberal vote. If, as seems more likely, however, Vargas does not intend to submit his government to popular revision, Aranha's presence in the Cabinet might prove embarrassing. Recent events indicate that all articulate resistance to the 1937 coup, which dissolved Congress and instituted the Army-supported "New State," is being progressively stifled. In the past weeks a number of pro-democratic periodicals of national circulation have been shut down. Even more serious has been the replacing of important friends of collaboration between the United States and Brazil either with "strong men" like Coriolano de Goes, new Chief of the Federal Police, or with obscure department employees who may be expected to do as they are told. Acting Foreign Minister, Pedro Leao Velloso, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seems to be of the latter stamp. The forces of Brazilian reaction appear to be tightening their lines against the advent of peace.

One by-product of the change may well be recognition of the military government of Argentina. Brazil, already closely associated economically as the greatest source of Argentina's imports and the third largest contender for its exports, may seek in this fashion to ally itself politically with the Farrell regime. It is also possible that certain elements within

the Army are not unfriendly to the idea of thus actively expressing dislike of United States "intervention" in national and hemispheric affairs. The question confronting Brazilians today is whether such a step would be in harmony with the "fundamental directives of its foreign policy of continental solidarity and strict cooperation with the Allied Nations," reaffirmed on the occasion of the Foreign Minister's retirement.

UNREST BELOW THE BORDER. What is happening in Brazil is not an isolated incident but the reflection of a widespread and growing disquietude in Latin America. As the European war draws to a close, the fundamental political and economic problems of the continent, shelved for the duration, are reasserting themselves with new urgency. Not to be disassociated from these are the increasing manifestations of anti-American feeling, for they spring from a deep-seated suspicion that the United States is in Latin America to stay. The fact that Congress delays action on the bill granting self-government to Puerto Rico disturbs Latin Americans, the more so since they have always regarded that island as a sounding board of their big neighbor's intentions toward the rest of the hemisphere. Despite repeated denials on the part of the State Department, the conviction is strongly held in some quarters that this country will not only refuse to withdraw from bases in Brazil and the Caribbean but will attempt to acquire new ones. The resolution offered by Senator McKellar on August 15 that the United States purchase the Galapagos Islands from Ecuador did not allay their fears, although President Velasco Ibarra characterized the proposal as unrepresentative of American opinion. In the days ahead, Latin America and the United States alike must bring to bear on these knotty aspects of continental and internal affairs all the statesmanship that can be mustered.

OLIVE HOLMES

U.S. MILITARY MISSION CONFERS WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS

The arrival of an American military mission at Yen-an, nerve center of the Communist areas in China, is an event that would have attracted considerable attention in any summer other than the present one with its impressive successes in Europe. Yet, the development is full of significance for the prosecution of the war against Japan. It means, in its most immediate sense, that the United States has succeeded in breaking down one of the barriers separating the American armed forces from China's fighting guerrillas. Taken more broadly it suggests the increasing determination of the State Department and our military leaders to exert every effort to prevent China's internal political problems from impeding essential war operations.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES. The mission, small in size, is a token of possible actions to come. In an-

nouncing on August 2 that the Americans were en route to the Communist areas, a Chungking spokesman declared that the group had three purposes: to collect aeronautical data and weather information, to aid American airmen forced down in Communist territory, and to develop closer cooperation between Chinese ground forces and American air units. To these goals Colonel Davis Barrett, head of the mission, added a fourth when he stated after arriving at Yen-an: "We have come here to study how these people have been able to keep the superiorly armed Japs in north China at bay for seven years." This declaration recognizing the great military role of the guerrillas is all the more significant because some military and political leaders in Chungking have publicly contended that the Communists do not fight. Such is clearly not the view of the United States Army.

This country has wanted to establish contact with the Yen'an headquarters of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies for a long time, but only now has it become possible to secure the permission of the Chungking government. The development is intimately linked with the launching of our B-29 Superfortress raids, for the guerrilla areas could provide excellent bases against the enemy's "inner zone" in north China, Manchuria, Korea and the Japanese homeland. It is also not a coincidence that the dispatch of the mission has occurred at a time when the war against Germany is entering its final phase. With the United States and Britain moving steadily closer to the period when their full strength can be turned against Japan, and with the China front a notoriously weak base from which to use that strength, every effort must be made in the coming months to bolster China's fighting power. In this effort, it would be dangerous to ignore any forces in China that are hitting the enemy effectively and whose territory would provide us with new ways of striking at Japan.

INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. It is an appalling fact that, despite Japan's success in taking the key points of Changsha, Loyang and Hengyang within the past three months, there is still no military cooperation between the two main bodies of China's troops—those of the Central government, numbering some 3,000,000, and the Communist forces, estimated roughly at 500,000. Indeed, many divisions of Central soldiers are still blockading the Communist areas. Under the circumstances it has been imperative that the United States establish its own contact with the Communists, paralleling the contact we have long had with the armies of the Central government.

By being represented in both areas, we may, in effect, establish a liaison between the Chinese groups, for if our air operations are coordinated with the local ground activities of the Communist and Chungking forces, the two may find after a while that their separate actions have begun to dovetail as parts of a single military plan. This would encourage the conclusion of a political accord. Recognition by the

United States of the guerrillas' place in the war effort might remove from discussion one issue between them and the Central government: whether the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should be incorporated fully into the struggle against Japan; or whether Chungking, while in a state of war with the Japanese, should devote a large part of its energy to restricting guerrilla activities.

It must be emphasized, however, that at present the American mission's purpose is simply to secure information and carry on discussions. Whether Chungking has as yet consented to the implementation of any plans that may be reached is not publicly known. It may be significant that, when Dr. K. C. Wu, Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, was asked on August 2 whether American air bases in Communist territory would not be very valuable to the Allies, he replied that "the question of bases in those areas has not arisen." He added that he did not know what attitude his government would take toward such a proposal. Yet, nothing is clearer than the fact that, unless such bases are established and other concrete measures of cooperation instituted, the mission will have been little more than a sight-seeing tour.

LIFTING THE BLOCKADE. If the guerrilla regions of north and central China are to make their maximum contribution in the war against Japan, two steps are necessary: the Central government must lift its long-standing blockade on supplies for the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and it must grant permission to the American authorities to work with those armies in the same way as with other Chinese forces. When one considers what the guerrillas have been able to do all these years while lacking outside supplies, air support and advice, it is obvious that their war effort, with these factors present, would be capable of enormous expansion. The result would be to help shorten the struggle against Japan and save many lives of Chinese, American and other United Nations troops.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

Ten Escape from Tojo, by Commander Melvyn H. McCoy and Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Mellnik, as told to Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley. New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1944. \$1.00

The story of Japan's brutal treatment of American and Filipino prisoners of war captured on Bataan and Corregidor.

Germany After Hitler, by Paul Hagen. New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1944. \$2.00

Because of his experience as an anti-Nazi in the underground movement the writer has faith in possible revolution backed by youth and underground groups but fears the Allied armies may back leaders who will again plan war.

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